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I. INTRODUCTION
Courts in the European Union (EU) have long held that the individual
rights to privacy and data protection are fundamental rights.1 Nonetheless,
recent cases before the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and
the national courts of some member states presented questions of exactly
how far these rights may extend.2 In Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española
de Protección de Datos, the CJEU held for the first time that EU citizens
have a right to be forgotten.3 Scholars have generally defined the right to be
forgotten as an individual’s right to remove or restrict the public’s access to
that individual’s personal information on the internet.4 With this decision,
the CJEU imposed a duty upon search engine operators to protect EU
citizens’ personal information. Those operators must now honor requests to
remove information from the list of results displayed when an individual’s
name is entered into the search engine.5 Such a decision has far-reaching
implications for other fundamental rights recognized by the CJEU, notably
the right to freedom of expression.6
In the days following the CJEU’s decision, business executives and legal
scholars alike were in an uproar over its potential ramifications. Some
Steven C. Bennett, The “Right To Be Forgotten”: Reconciling EU and US Perspectives,
30 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 161, 168 (2012).
2 See, e.g., Case C-101/01, Sweden v. Bodil Lindqvist, 2003 E.C.R. I-12992, I-13004-06
(Nov. 6, 2003) [hereinafter Bodil Lindqvist], available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/showPdf.
jsf?text=&docid=48382&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=1st&dir=&occ=first&part=1&ci
d=361596 (referring the following question to the CJEU: “Can the provisions of [Directive
95/46], in a case such as the above, be regarded as bringing about a restriction which conflicts
with the general principles of freedom of expression or other freedoms or rights. . . .”); Case
C-524/06, Huber v. Germany, 2008 ECR I-09705, ¶ 40 (Dec. 16, 2008), available at http://eur
-lex.europa.eu/legal-conent/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:62006CJ0524&qid=14570405342
05&from=EN (referring the following question to the CJEU: “Is the general processing of
personal data of foreign citizens of the Union in a central register of foreign nationals
compatible with . . . the requirement of necessity under Article 7(e) of Directive 95/46?”).
3 Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v. Agencia Española de Protección de
Datos (AEDP), Mario Costeja González, 2014 ECLI:EU:C:2014:317, ¶ 100(3) (May 13,
2014) [hereinafter Google Spain], http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text
=&docid=152065&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=1st&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=356
089.
4 David Lindsay, The ‘Right To Be Forgotten’ in European Data Protection Law, in
EMERGING CHALLENGES IN PRIVACY LAW 290, 313 (Normann Witzleb et al. eds., 2014).
5 Google Spain, Case C-131/12, ¶ 100(3).
6 See generally David Drummond, Op-Ed., We Need to Talk About the Right To Be
Forgotten, THE GUARDIAN (July 10, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/
jul/10/right-to-be-forgotten-european-ruling-google-debate.
1
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argued that Google Spain was a blow to the freedom of expression and the
right of the public to access information—both of which are expressly
protected under Article 11 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union (Charter).7 This Note addresses that criticism as well as the
tension which exists between the right to be forgotten and the freedom of
expression.
Exploration of the scope of the right to be forgotten and its implications
for internet search engine providers is critically important. Despite the
unprecedented nature of the case, the CJEU provided little guidance as to
how to practically implement the right to be forgotten, and failed to clearly
specify what kinds of companies would be affected.8 An analysis of the
tension between the rights at issue is crucial to achieving greater clarity in
EU law. Courts, claimants, and the defendants of those claims will benefit
from having more guidance about the parameters of the right to be forgotten
and the grounds upon which such a claim can be raised.9
This Note addresses the questions raised by Google Spain, and argues that
a right to be forgotten can exist alongside the freedom of expression.
Additionally, this Note argues that any balance between these two principles
should be formulated in a way that provides clear legal guidance to those
affected by the Google Spain decision. Part I discusses the state of European
privacy and data protection law leading up to the Google Spain decision.
Part II then examines the tension between the right to be forgotten and the
freedom of expression in comparison to similar tensions in EU law. Lastly,
Part III identifies the kind of data protection schemes that would resolve the
questions raised by Google Spain, demonstrates that the right to be forgotten
See, e.g., Roy Greenslade, Article 19’s Call to Google Over ‘Right To Be Forgotten’
Ruling, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 16, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/media/greenslade/2014/
oct/16/freedom-of-speech-google (discussing an advocacy group’s plea to Google to protect
the freedom of expression despite the court’s decision in Google Spain); see also Drummond,
supra note 6. See generally Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art. 11,
2012 O.J. (C 326) 391, 398 [hereinafter Charter].
8 For example, some scholars and legal analysts have questioned whether companies like
Facebook that have a search feature will be captured by the Google Spain decision. See, e.g.,
Jeffrey Toobin, The Solace of Oblivion, NEW YORKER, Sept. 29, 2014, at 26, available at
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/09/29/solace-oblivion.
9 The CJEU failed to delineate what kinds of information individuals can have removed
and whether the right would apply differently to public figures, leaving companies to adopt
their own standards for when to grant a request. See, e.g., Alistair Barr & Rolfe Winkler,
Google Offers ‘Right To Be Forgotten’ Form in Europe, WALL ST. J., May 30, 2014, http://
www.wsj.com/articles/google-committee-of-experts-to-deal-with-right-to-be-forgotten-14014
26748.
7
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can exist alongside the freedom of expression in EU law, and provides useful
guidance to those whose task it is to give effect to this right.
II. HISTORY OF PRIVACY AND DATA PROTECTION RIGHTS IN THE EUROPEAN
UNION AND ITS MEMBER STATES
The CJEU’s recognition of a right to be forgotten is unprecedented, but
momentum towards this kind of privacy right was present well before the
CJEU considered Google Spain.10 Exploration of the roots of data protection
rights provides an important basis for understanding the complexity of and
rationale behind a right to be forgotten. In fact, developments in EU law and
the law of its member states laid the foundation for the right to be forgotten
as recognized in Google Spain.11
A. Data Protection Laws Before 1995 and the EU’s Data Protection
Directive
In the years following World War II, European societies developed an
interest in the protection of privacy rights.12 European governments
responded to this increased interest by proposing and enacting privacy laws
within their countries.13 As inconsistencies between the various state laws
arose, government officials and scholars called for harmonization across
Europe.14
The Council of Europe made an early attempt to harmonize the region’s
privacy and data protection laws by enacting the Convention for the
Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal
Data.15 This was the first legally binding data protection treaty to come into

10 Lindsay, supra note 4, at 302–06 (describing the history of relevant privacy rights in EU
member states).
11 See infra Part II.A–B (describing the history and development of EU and member state
privacy and data protection law).
12 JACQUELINE KLOSEK, THE WAR ON PRIVACY 78 (2007) (“In the years following World
War II, in light of the horrors raised by the holocaust, governments were sensitive to the
importance of respecting their citizens’ right to maintain the privacy of certain personal
information.”).
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of
Personal Data, Council of Europe, pmbl., opened for signature, Jan. 28, 1981, C.E.T.S. No.
108 [hereinafter Convention].
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force in Europe.16 It guarantees an individual’s right to access any of his or
her stored personal information.17 However, the Convention also includes a
number of exceptions to that right.18 For example, it expressly states that a
member state may derogate from certain treaty provisions when “such
derogation is provided for by the law of the Party and constitutes a necessary
measure,” or when personal data is used for statistics or scientific research
with no risk of infringement on privacy.19 With its focus on the protection of
individual privacy rights, the Convention paved the way for more extensive
data protection initiatives, the most important being the EU’s 1995 Data
Protection Directive.20
Since the Convention entered into force, EU law has moved toward
“put[ting] individuals in control of their own data and reinforc[ing] legal and
practical certainty for economic operators and public authorities.”21
Improvements upon existing technological capabilities and the development
of an “information society” led to the enactment of the EU’s Directive on the
Protection of Individuals with regard to the Processing of Personal Data and
on the Free Movement of Such Data (Data Protection Directive) in 1995.22
Using the Convention as a starting point, the EU moved toward even greater
harmonization and consistency between the data protection laws of its
member states.23
COUNCIL OF EUROPE, Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to
Automatic Processing of Personal Data: Summary, http://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/
full-list/-/conventions/treaty/108.
17 Convention, supra note 15, art. 8
18 Id. art. 9.
19 Id.
20 Lindsay, supra note 4, at 308.
21 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the
Protection of Individuals with regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free
Movement of Such Data (General Data Protection Regulation), at 2, COM (2012) 11 final
(Jan. 25, 2012) [hereinafter General Data Protection Regulation], available at http://eur-lex.e
uropa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52012PC0011&from=en.
22 Directive 95/46/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995
on the Protection of Individuals with regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the
Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 31–32 [hereinafter Data Protection
Directive], available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:31
995L0046&qid=1456693976267&from=EN.
23 Peter Hustinx, The Reform of EU Data Protection: Towards More Effective and More
Consistent Data Protection Across the EU, in EMERGING CHALLENGES IN PRIVACY LAW 64
(Normann Witzleb et al. eds., 2014) (noting that the European Commission was pushed to
adopt the Data Protection Directive because of the need for greater harmonization and
consistency among national laws than the Convention would facilitate).
16
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In the Data Protection Directive, the European Commission
(Commission), the EU’s independent executive body responsible for
proposing and enforcing European legislation, announced two reasons for
expanding the Union’s data protection framework. First, it stated that the
lack of harmony between European data protection laws would create
obstacles for data transfers between countries.24 Second, the Commission
noted that increased data protection was necessary to safeguard “fundamental
rights and freedoms.”25 The Data Protection Directive sets forth standards
that all states must meet and—within the confines of the Directive—provides
states “considerable leeway” as to how those norms may be implemented.26
While a right to be forgotten is not expressly mentioned in the Data
Protection Directive, Articles 6, 12, and 14 all suggest that individuals have
control over their personal information, and a general right to “erase” said
information. For example, Article 6(1) unequivocally provides that personal
information may not be kept for any longer than necessary to fulfill the
purpose for which the information was originally collected.27 This statement
suggests companies may not treat an individual’s personal information like
an ordinary consumer good—i.e., because the information relates to an
individual, it may not be used indefinitely. The Data Protection Directive’s
prohibition on retaining information after a certain period of time also
introduces the idea of collectors (such as search engine companies) engaging
in data erasure, even if that is not the only means of complying with the
law.28
Article 12 of the Data Protection Directive makes a more direct reference
to the erasure of data.29 This provision not only grants individuals the right
to block the processing of any information that does not comply with the
Directive’s requirements,30 but also provides the right to apply to have such
Data Protection Directive, supra note 22, pmbl. 8.
Id. pmbl. 10.
26 Id. art. 5; CHRISTOPHER KUNER, EUROPEAN DATA PRIVACY LAW AND ONLINE BUSINESS
29 (2003).
27 Data Protection Directive, supra note 22, art. 6(1)(e).
28 Lindsay, supra note 4, at 309 (noting the Data Protection Directive provides for the
erasure of data in three distinct provisions, including one prohibiting the retention of collected
data for no longer than necessary to achieve the purpose of a data collection initiative).
29 Data Protection Directive, supra note 22, art. 12.
30 Id. art. (a) (“Member States shall guarantee every data subject the right to obtain from the
controller . . .as appropriate the . . . erasure or blocking of data the processing of which does
not comply with the provisions of this Directive, in particular because of the incomplete or
inaccurate nature of the data.”).
24
25
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information erased.31 Article 12 thus represents a crucial step toward
conferring individuals an express right to have their information erased.
Lastly, Article 14 grants EU citizens the right to object to data processing
and requires the controller to comply with valid objections.32 The
Directive’s requirement that controllers cease processing data upon receiving
successful objections is important because such language implies a qualified
right of erasure.33 Thus, these provisions within the Data Protection
Directive represent the precursor to the EU’s official recognition of a right to
be forgotten.
In 2012, the Commission proposed a major reform of the 1995 Data
Protection Directive.34 In adopting this proposal—known as the General
Data Protection Regulation or GDPR—the Commission noted that the Data
Protection Directive, while sound in its objectives and principles, allowed for
inconsistent implementation across member states.35 The 2012 GDPR was
therefore touted as an opportunity for the EU to create a stronger and more
cohesive data protection law.36
Arguably, the most controversial reform in the GDPR was set forth in
Article 17, which provides that individuals “shall have the right to obtain
from the controller the erasure of personal data relating to them” provided
that the individual can meet one of four grounds for erasure.37 The four
grounds for erasure are: (1) “the data are no longer necessary in relation to
the purposes for which they were collected,” (2) a person withdraws the
consent that the processing was based on or the storage period consented to
expired, (3) a person objects to the data processing pursuant to Article 19,
31 Id. (stating individuals have the right to obtain from the data collector the “rectification,
erasure or blocking of data” when appropriate). This suggests that individuals may petition
for the removal of data and said petition will be reviewed by the appropriate authority.
32 Id. art. 14(a) (“Where there is a justified objection, the processing instigated by the
controller may no longer involve those data.”).
33 Lindsay, supra note 4, at 309–10. See also Bert-Jaap Koops, Forgetting Footprints,
Shunning Shadows: A Critical Analysis of the “Right to Be Forgotten” in Big Data Practice,
SCRIPTED, Dec. 2011, at 229, 240, available at http://script-ed.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/
12/koops.pdf (noting that Article 14 of the Data Protection Directive allows individuals to
invoke the right to be forgotten when the retention of the data would be harmful to the
individual).
34 Press Release, Eur. Comm’n, Commission Proposes a Comprehensive Reform of Data
Protection Rules to Increase Users’ Control of Their Data and the Cut Costs for Business (Jan.
25, 2012), available at http://Europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-46_en.htm?locale=en.
35 General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 21, at 2.
36 Id.
37 Id. at 51.
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and (4) the processing does not comply with the GDPR.38 In its explanatory
memorandum on the GDPR, the Commission clarified that Article 17
affirmatively provides EU citizens with a right to be forgotten and a right to
erasure.39 The 2012 proposal is the first time the EU formally recognized the
right of individuals to be “forgotten.”40
Though some scholars viewed the GDPR as a welcome and necessary
change, Article 17’s recognition of a right to be forgotten was highly
controversial.41 Some argued that this right was an unprecedented form of
online censorship, with others going so far as to claim that it represented the
biggest threat to freedom of speech in recent years.42 Despite those critiques,
the history of data protection laws in Europe represents the level of
transnational interest in according greater privacy rights to personal
information that makes its way onto the internet.
B. Data Protection Laws Within European Nations
Recognition of a right to be forgotten also gained support from within the
domestic laws of its member states.43 Many countries developed expansive

Id.
Id. at 9.
40 Id.
41 For an example of support for the GDPR and the right to be forgotten, see John Hendel,
Why Journalists Shouldn’t Fear Europe’s ‘Right to Be Forgotten,’ THE ATLANTIC (Jan. 25,
2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2012/01/why-journalists-shouldnt-feareuropes-right-to-be-forgotten/251955/2/.
42 See Jeffrey Rosen, The Right to Be Forgotten, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 88, 88 (2012)
(arguing that the right to be forgotten is “the biggest threat to free speech in the coming
decade”); Jane Yakowitz, More Crap from the E.U., INFO/LAW BLOG (Jan. 25, 2012), http://
blogs.law.harvard.edu/infolaw/2012/01/25/more-crap-from-the-e-u/ (opining that the EU is
engaging in “a misguided attack on the information economy”). For a more recent expression
of this argument, see Olivia Solon, EU ‘Right To Be Forgotten’ Ruling Paves Way for
Censorship, WIRED.CO.UK (May 13, 2014), http://www.wired.co.uk/news/archive/2014-05/
13/right-to-be-forgotten-blog.
43 See GLORIA GONZÁLEZ FUSTER, The Surfacing of National Norms on Data Processing in
Europe, in THE EMERGENCE OF PERSONAL DATA AS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT OF THE EU 245–47
(2014). In some countries, the concept of a right to be forgotten emerged as a general right to
data protection. The French government conceived of this concept as a right to oblivion or
droit à l’oubli numérique (right to digital forgetfulness). Similarly, the Spanish government
referred to this concept as a right to forget, or derecho al olvido. In Italy, the right to be
forgotten is most closely related to the right to oblivion, or dirrito all’ oblio. Lindsay, supra
note 4, at 302.
38
39
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bodies of law around privacy rights and a right to be forgotten.44 In
particular, this Note will focus on the efforts that took place in Germany and
France45—both of which used a strong tradition of personality and privacy
rights as the foundation for the development of the right to be forgotten.46
The legal developments within these member states, along with
developments in EU law, make plain the recognition of the right to be
forgotten prior to the ECJ’s decision in Google Spain.
1. Data Protection Laws in Germany Prior to Google Spain
Germany recognized an individual’s right to privacy and control over his
or her personal information long before the Google Spain decision. In 1973,
the German Federal Constitutional Court expressly recognized that
individuals have a fundamental right to determine how their personal
information is used.47 Similarly, in 2003, Germany implemented legislation
granting an implicit right to erase personal data processed in both the public
and private sector.48 These steps toward broader personal privacy rights
provide evidence of the recognition of the right to be forgotten at the national
level.
In Lebach I, the complainant argued the defendant television company
infringed upon his right of personality when the company sought to
broadcast a documentary about his conviction for robbery.49 Significantly,
the documentary included the complainant’s name, photograph, and
references to his sexual orientation.50 In overturning the lower court’s
44 FUSTER, supra note 43, at 55–70 (noting the development of data protection and privacy
laws in Germany, Sweden, France, Denmark, Norway, Luxembourg, Portugal, Austria, and
Spain in the 1970s and 1980s).
45 I consider the efforts in Germany and France to be most relevant since those countries are
two of the most influential members of the EU.
46 Lindsay, supra note 4, at 302 (outlining the emergence of the right to be forgotten in
France as originating from “three related, but conceptually and historically distinguished
rights”).
47 Bundesverfassungsgericht
[BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] 1973, 35
Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 202 (Ger.), translated in DONALD
P. KOMMERS & RUSSELL A. MILLER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL
REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 479–83 (3d ed. 2012) [hereinafter Lebach I].
48 Bundesdatenschutzgesetz [BDSG] [Federal Data Protection Act], 14 Jan. 2003,
Bundesgesetzblatt [BGBl] at 66, § 1(1) (Ger.) [hereinafter Federal Data Protection Act],
available at http://www.iuscomp.org/gla/statutes/BDSG.htm.
49 Lebach I, supra note 47, at 479–80.
50 Id. at 480.
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decision to allow the documentary to air, the Federal Constitutional Court
noted, “[i]n principle, everyone has the right to determine for him- or herself
whether and to what extent others may make public an account of either
certain like incidents or one’s entire life story.”51 With that statement, the
court acknowledged that individuals have a right to control their personal
information, and thus have a right to exclude others from access to said
information.
The Federal Constitutional Court went on to explicitly establish limits on
the right of self-determination.52 The court reasoned that since both a right to
self-determination and a right to access information were included in
German constitutional law, neither held precedence over the other.53
However, the court acknowledged that under certain circumstances the right
to privacy trumps any public information rights.54 Nevertheless, the fact that
the documentary’s subject matter was no longer current information and that
it could have the effect of limiting the complainant’s reintegration into
society persuaded the court to rule in the complainant’s favor.55
Germany’s legislative branch took up the crusade toward greater privacy
rights as well. Recognition of an individual’s right to control personal data
was reinforced by the national government’s passage of the Act on
Protection against Misuse of Personal Data in Data Processing (Federal
Data Protection Act).56 The Act—which focused on data processing in both
the public and private sector—noted that its purpose was “to protect the
individual against his right to privacy being impaired through the handling of
his personal data.”57 The 1997 version of the Federal Data Protection Act
stipulated that the processing of personal data was forbidden unless
authorized by another provision in the Act, or consented to by the individual
whose data was being processed.58 As these examples show, the German
legal system has given individuals an express right to control their
information, and an implicit right to erase personal information by
withdrawing consent to its collection.

51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58

Id.
Id. at 480–81 (explaining the scope of limits on that right for private individuals).
Id. at 481.
Id. at 481–82.
Id. at 483.
Federal Data Protection Act, supra note 48.
Id.
FUSTER, supra note 43, at 60.
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2. Data Protection Laws in France Prior to Google Spain
Lawmakers in France also used legislative acts to recognize data
protection rights. In 1978, the National Assembly (Assemblée Nationale)
adopted the Act on Information Technology, Data Files and Civil Liberties.59
The law included, among other provisions, a right to refuse the processing of
data.60 Under this law, individuals who provided proof of identity could
request that the data controller “rectify, complete, update, block, or delete”
any personal information that was inaccurate or expired.61 The French
government’s assertion that individuals can request the deletion of personal
information in certain circumstances suggests that it supports the right of
erasure.
The French and German experiences evidence the recognition of
personality rights in the collection, storage, and (in some cases) erasure of
data at the national level. Moreover, these experiences illustrate that member
states have not only contemplated the tension between privacy rights and the
freedom of expression, but have concluded that these rights can coexist.
This conclusion, in conjunction with the previously outlined examples of
Community-wide legislation, set the stage for the CJEU’s recognition of the
right to be forgotten in Google Spain.
C. Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos
In Google Spain, the CJEU held that search engine operators must
remove links to webpages displayed following the search of an individual’s
name that are “inadequate, irrelevant, or no longer relevant, or excessive in
relation to the purposes of the processing at issue.”62 This remains true even
when the information has been published lawfully and is factually correct.63
Although the CJEU’s decision was unprecedented, it was not wholly
unexpected. No EU law formally extended a right to be forgotten, however,
the culmination of legal developments that had resulted since the passage of
59 Loi 78-17 du 6 janvier 1978 relative à l’informatique, aux fichiers et aux libertés [Law
78-17 of January 6, 1978 on Information Technology, Data Files, and Civil Liberties],
Commission Nationale de L’informatique et des Libertés [CNIL] [National Commission on
Informatics and Liberty], Aug. 6, 2004 [hereinafter French Data Protection Law], available at
http://www.legilsationline.org/documents/id/744.
60 Id. arts. 38, 40.
61 Id. art. 40 (emphasis added).
62 Google Spain, Case C-131/12, ¶ 94.
63 Id.
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the Convention certainly signaled the evolution of the right. Moreover, the
increasing number of complaints against search engine companies and calls
for an official recognition of a right to be forgotten illustrate this point.64
On March 5, 2010, Mr. Costeja-González filed a complaint with the
Spanish Data Protection Agency over search results related to a repossession
of his home in 1998.65 Prior to filing a complaint, Mr. Costeja-González
attempted to have Google remove the information, arguing that the news
stories were outdated because the debt owed on the home had been paid and
the home sold.66 When Google’s formal complaint process failed to provide
a remedy, Costeja-González filed his complaint with Spanish authorities.67
He requested, among other things, that Google Spain or Google, Inc. be
required to remove or conceal the news stories so that they no longer
appeared in search results.68 The Spanish Data Protection Agency honored
Consteja-González’s request.69 Google Spain and Google, Inc. appealed the
Agency’s decision to the Spanish National High Court, the Audiencia
Nacional, and that court referred the decision to the CJEU.70
To determine whether Mr. Consteja-Gonzalez had a right to remove the
links, the CJEU evaluated the scope of the 1995 Data Protection Directive.71
Ultimately, the CJEU reached three important conclusions regarding
Google’s duty to erase personal information and the right to be forgotten.
First, the CJEU found that search engines engage in the processing of
personal data, and are therefore “controllers” within the meaning of Article
2(b) and (d).72 Next, the CJEU concluded that Articles 12(b) and 14 should
be interpreted to mean that search engine operators, such as Google, are
required to remove links to web pages that are displayed following a search
of an individual’s name at the request of that individual.73 Finally, the CJEU
held that the right to have personal information removed is limited74—a
See generally Kashmir Hill, Plastic Surgeon’s Legal Quest to Facelift Google Search
Results, FORBES, Mar. 7, 2011, http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2011/03/07/plastic-su
rgeons-legal-quest-to-facelift-google-search-results/.
65 Google Spain, Case C-131/12, ¶ 14.
66 The Man Who Sued Google to Be Forgotten, NEWSWEEK, May 30, 2014, available at
http://www.newsweek.com/man-who-sued-google-be-forgotten-252854.
67 Id.
68
Google Spain, Case C-131/12, ¶ 15.
69 Id. ¶ 17.
70 Id. ¶¶ 18, 20.
71 Id. ¶ 20 (describing the legal issues the CJEU address in this case).
72 Id. ¶ 100(1).
73 Id. ¶ 100(3).
74 Id. ¶ 100(4).
64
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complainant must establish that he or she has a right to have the information
removed, and demonstrate that there is not a “preponderant interest of the
general public” in accessing the information.75 Though the court briefly
addressed the scope of this newly defined right, it left room for further
discussion and interpretation regarding how the right would fit into the
greater context of EU law.76
III. TENSION BETWEEN A RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN AND FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION
Generally, both the CJEU and scholars agree that balance is needed
between the right to be forgotten and the freedom of expression.77 What is
undecided is how much weight one right should carry in relation to the other,
and who should conduct the balancing. This section addresses those
lingering questions following the CJEU’s Google Spain decision. It begins
by first defining the freedom of expression. Next, this section clarifies
exactly where the points of tension between the freedom of expression and
the right to be forgotten lie. Lastly, this section offers an analysis of the
varying ways the CJEU can strike a balance between the rights at issue. In
so doing, it offers a critique of each method, and ultimately points out the
kinds of questions the CJEU should be weary of as it interprets the rule set
out in Google Spain in the future.
A. Defining the Freedom of Expression
Despite its strict adherence to notions of individual privacy rights, the EU
has expressly recognized that individuals have a fundamental right to free
expression.78 According to the CJEU, the freedom of expression includes the
expression of opinions and the freedom to receive and impart information.79
Additionally, the court has cited with approval decisions from the European
Court of Human Rights holding that the freedom of expression is applicable
Id.
See supra note 8 (describing one question left open by the Google Spain decision).
77
See, e.g., Google Spain, Case C-131/12, ¶ 85 (discussing the conflict between an
individual’s right to privacy, a journalist or publisher’s freedom of expression, and how
Article 9 of the Data Protection Directive balances that conflict).
78 Charter, art. 11, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 391, 398.
79 Case C-73/07, Tietosuojavaltuutettu v. Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy, 2008 E.C.R. I9831, ¶ 39 (May 8, 2008) [hereinafter Satakunnan Markkinapörssi], available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:62007CJ0073.
75
76
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to both information that offends or shocks the state, and information that is
favorably received.80 As the newer rule, tradition dictates that the right to be
forgotten should be altered as necessary to fit into the previously established
framework of Community law with respect to the freedom of expression.81
B. Points of Tension Between Freedom of Expression and the Right to Be
Forgotten
Some scholars and business executives have opposed the recognition of a
right to be forgotten, claiming it is an imposition into free expression rights
and amounts to censorship.82 To place these criticisms in perspective, it is
necessary to examine the specific points at which the right to be forgotten
creates tension with the freedom of expression.
1. Tension Between Public Access to Information and Individual Privacy
Rights
The language used in Google Spain illuminates the first point of tension
between the rights at issue—the tension between public access to
information versus individual privacy.83 The CJEU specifically noted that a
right to be forgotten cannot exist without balancing other relevant interests
like the freedom of expression.84 In other words, neither right takes absolute
precedence over the other.
In some cases, the CJEU has determined that it is reasonable to allow free
access to information.85 This is especially true when the information is used
for journalistic purposes.86 However, acceptance of this form of expression
conflicts with the CJEU’s proposition that an individual’s interest in
removing personal data outweighs the public’s interest in accessing his or her
information; even if said information has been lawfully published and is

Id.
Miguel Pojares Maduro, Interpreting European Law: Judicial Adjudication in a Context
of Constitutional Pluralism, 1 EUR. J. LEGAL STUD. 138, 146 (2007) (describing the CJEU’s
adherence to a “precedent oriented” approach that defers to a well-established line of case
law).
82 Rosen, supra note 42; Yakowitz, supra note 42.
83 Google Spain, Case C-131/12, § 14.
84 Id.
85 Id. ¶ 97.
86 See id. ¶ 85.
80
81
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true.87 Accordingly, personal data included in internet search results that
falls within the provisions of the Data Protection Directive provides an
individual with a prevailing right of removal.88
The CJEU’s convicting recognition of these counter vailing positions
leads to the conclusion that the relevant compelling interest—public or
private—depends on the facts of given case. There is arguably some social
utility in allowing one right to trump the other in cases where access to
information is justified by a compelling public interest, or where the interests
of the individual prevail. Nevertheless, since one right cannot always trump
the other, these competing justifications necessarily result in tension between
the right to be forgotten and the right to freedom of expression.
2. Tension Between Access to Information for Research and Government
Authority to Regulate Access
A second point of tension results from the conflict between data
collection for journalistic and public research purposes, and the state’s right
to regulate data collection for the protection of individuals. In Google Spain,
the CJEU concluded the Data Protection Directive required search engine
operators to remove unwanted links to sites with information relating to a
person that appear after a search of their name.89 Moreover, the court further
held that in cases where a legitimate right to removal is found, that right
overrides “the interest of the general public in finding that information upon
a search relating to the [individual’s] name.”90
Such language is in obvious tension with the right to freedom of
expression granted in Article 11 of the Charter.91 Although the Charter also
protects an individual’s personal data, it does not do so at the expense of the
freedom of expression, and does not purport to hold one right in greater
importance over the other.92 Since the decision of the CJEU upholds the
right to be forgotten at the expense of—in some cases—the freedom of

See id. ¶¶ 94, 97.
Id.
89 Id. ¶ 100(3).
90 Id. ¶ 97.
91 Id. (indicating that there are situations, like when a public figure is involved, when the
interest of the public will outweigh the right of erasure).
92 Charter, art. 8(1), 2012 O.J. (C 326) 391, 397 (“Everyone has the right to the protection
of personal data concerning him or her.”).
87
88

2015]

RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN

181

expression and information, it is in tension with the plain language of the
Charter.93
C. Addressing the Tension Between Privacy Rights and Freedom of
Expression
Despite the tension between the right to be forgotten and the freedom of
expression, it is possible for these rights to coexist within the EU’s body of
law. Perhaps the easiest way to demonstrate how these rights can coexist is
with a few hypothetical scenarios. First, imagine a news article about a
prominent politician’s former membership in an unpopular social group
surfaces in an internet search of his name. The politician faces public
backlash for his prior membership in the group, and seeks to invoke the right
to be forgotten under Google Spain.
Second, imagine photographs of a university student consuming alcohol
at a social event are posted on the internet. Years later, when the student is
applying for work, she finds that a link to the photographs is one of the first
results displayed upon a Google search of her name.
Lastly, imagine that a private restaurant owner finds that negative reviews
of his business are displayed when his name is entered into Google’s search
bar. Would the Google Spain decision require links to this personal
information be removed? This section attempts to answer this question using
the balancing tests suggested by prior ECJ case law and EU scholars.
1. ECJ Case Law and Proposals for Balancing: Reasoning by Analogy
One approach to easing the clash between the right to be forgotten and the
freedom of expression is to look to tensions between similar rights and the
way in which the CJEU has resolved them. The CJEU has analyzed conflicts
between individual privacy rights and the right of the public to access
information on many occasions. Exploring those decisions may aid in
understanding how the rights at issue in Google Spain can coexist.
For example, in previous cases the CJEU attempted to set guidelines for
balancing privacy and free expression rights.94 In Bodil Lindqvist, the CJEU
93 Google’s Chief Legal Officer, David Drummond, appeared to share this view when he
commented that Google’s decisions on what links to remove are based on the international
community’s understanding that everyone has a right to freedom of expression. Drummond,
supra note 6.
94 See Bodil Lindqvist, Case-101/01; Satakunnan Markkinaporssi, Case C-73/07.
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noted that standards for balancing competing interests are contained in the
Data Protection Directive.95 In particular, the Directive provides rules for
when the processing of personal information is allowed, and requires
safeguards be implemented to protect the public.96 Specifically, Article 9
includes a derogation clause that allows states to impose exceptions to some
provisions of the Directive when the processing of personal information is
carried out for journalistic, artistic, or literary purposes, and only when
derogation is necessary to reconcile a right to privacy with the freedom of
expression.97 Similarly, Article 13 provides that states may adopt legislation
to restrict the scope of some of the Directive’s provisions when doing so is
necessary for “the protection of the data subject or the rights and freedoms of
others.”98 In addition, the CJEU also offered its own guidelines for
balancing privacy and freedom of expression rights. It held that while the
member states have some autonomy to weigh personal privacy rights against
the freedom of expression, they should be diligent in ensuring the balance
comports with “the fundamental rights protected by the Community legal
order or with the other general principles of Community law.”99
The same logic can be applied to the right to be forgotten. Turning to the
hypothetical cases, the political figure would face some difficulty in
removing search results about his former membership in an unpopular group
because Google would argue those results were included for journalistic
purposes. The politician is a public figure, and as such, the public has a
greater interest in his personal life. The balance of interests in this case
would thus likely fall in favor of the search engine because the public interest
would outweigh the politician’s right to privacy. In contrast, the university
student might have more luck under the standard set forth in Bodil Lindqvist,
because the inclusion of links to otherwise social photographs does not
appear to fulfill a journalistic, artistic, or literary purpose.
By adding a provision to derogate under circumstances similar to those
recognized in Articles 9 and 13 of the Data Protection Directive, the CJEU
would create a space wherein member states could make their own decisions
regarding which right should carry more weight. For reasons discussed
below, that may not be the best solution. However, adherence to the CJEU’s
additional requirement that any balancing comport with the EU’s
95
96
97
98
99

Bodil Lindqvist, Case C-101/01, ¶ 82.
Id. ¶¶ 82–90.
Data Protection Directive, supra note 22, art. 9.
Id. art. 13(1)(g).
Bodil Lindqvist, Case C-101/01, ¶ 87.
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fundamental rights would make it clear that one right will not always take
precedence over the other, and that they can coexist.
In Tietosuojavaltuutettu v. Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy, the court also
suggested guidelines for balancing fundamental interests.100 There, the
CJEU noted that both individual privacy rights and the freedom of
expression can be restricted, provided that any imposed limitations are laid
down by law, meet the aims of protection of fundamental rights, and are
necessary for a democratic society.101 As was the case with the standard set
forth in Bodil Lindqvist, the outcome of the hypothetical complainants’ cases
might vary depending on where the case was brought, and that member
state’s interpretation of each of the aforementioned factors.
The balancing methods employed by the CJEU in these prior cases
provide member states with some guidance, but lack clear direction with
respect to application. Although the CJEU believes a lack of specificity is
necessary,102 some consistency in the standard used to conduct a balancing
test would likely accommodate the EU’s repeated concern regarding the
harmonization of data protection laws throughout the Community.103
Moreover, the ambiguity surrounding the CJEU’s decisions interpreting the
guidelines set forth in the Data Protection Directive allows member states to
make their own value judgments about which right—the right to be forgotten
or the freedom of expression—should be prioritized. As a result, decisions
regarding what is necessary for a democratic society, or needed for
journalistic, artistic, or literary purposes could vary widely across member
states. Thus, under the aforementioned hypothetical cases, one state might
decide that links to the news article about the politician are not necessary for
journalistic purposes, while another might reach the opposite conclusion.
Such flexibility invites unnecessary confusion into the law, and therefore
does not fully resolve the problem resulting from Google Spain.104
Satakunnan Markkinaporssi, Case C-73/07, ¶¶ 55–56.
Id. The language used by the court here is similar to the limiting language placed on the
right to privacy found in Article 8(2) of the European Convention on the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. See Convention, supra note 15, art. 8(2).
102 Bodil Lindqvist, Case C-101/01, ¶ 83 (“As regards Directive 95/46 itself, its provisions
are necessarily relatively general since it has to be applied to a large number of very different
situations.”).
103 See, e.g., Data Protection Directive, supra note 22, pmbl. 1 (listing “common action” and
the “elimination of barriers” as objectives of the EU); Bodil Lindqvist, Case C-101/01, ¶ 79.
104 Allowing member states to use general guidelines in making the ultimate decision
regarding balancing of such fundamental rights is unlikely to lead to greater harmony in data
protection laws across the EU. In fact, it was a lack of harmony in data protection and privacy
100
101
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2. Allowing the Member States to Strike a Balance
The CJEU has said that it is up to the member states to resolve tensions
between fundamental rights when the Data Protection Directive fails to
provide clear guidance. In Institut professionnel des agents immobiliers
(IPI) v. Englebert, the court held that Article 13 of the Data Protection
Directive grants member states the freedom to decide what legislative
measures they will take to address limits to a private individual’s right to
information.105 In other words, the court held that the EU Parliament
intended for the member states to exercise discretion over limits to the
individual right to control data.
The CJEU also endorsed state execution of a balancing test in early cases
like Bodil Lindqvist and Satakunnan Markkinapörssi. In Bodil Lindqvist, the
CJEU held that mechanisms for balancing the rights at issue are derived from
the “adoption, by the Member States, of national provisions implementing
that directive.”106 That rule was upheld some five years later in Satakunnan
Markkinapörssi, where the CJEU stated that when striking a balance between
rights, member states should be accorded broad discretion to apply their own
traditions and social values.107 Based on the information available, member
state balancing appears to be an appropriate solution to the dilemma
laws that prompted the EU to not only adopt the Data Protective Directive, but also consider
amendments to that agreement:
The current framework remains sound as far as its objectives and principles
are concerned, but it has not prevented fragmentation in the way personal
data protection is implemented across the Union, legal uncertainty and a
widespread public perception that there are significant risks associated
notably with online activity. This is why it is time to build a stronger and
more coherent data protection framework in the EU, backed by strong
enforcement that will allow the digital economy to develop across the internal
market, put individuals in control of their own data and reinforce legal and
practical certainty for economic operators and public authorities.
General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 21, at 2.
105 Case C-473/12, Institut professionnel de agents immobiliers (IPI) v. Englebert ¶ 42 (Nov.
7, 2013), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=144217&pageInde
x=0&doclang=en&mode=1st&dir=&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=383795 (“[Article 13] does
not oblige the Member States to lay down in their national law exceptions for the purposes
listed in Article 13(1)(a) to (g) but, on the contrary, the legislature intended to give them the
freedom to decide whether, and if so for what purposes, they wish to take legislative measures
aimed at limiting, inter alia, the extent of the obligations to inform the [individual whose data
was collected].”).
106 Bodil Lindquist, Case C-101/01, ¶ 82.
107 Satakunnan Markkinaporssi, Case C-73/07, ¶ 53.
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presented by the right to be forgotten. Nonetheless, the benefits of adopting
this option are outweighed by the problems it presents.
While a member state balancing approach has the benefit of simplicity, it
comes at the expense of consistency. The hypothetical case about the
restaurant owner illustrates the problem. A country like Germany—which
has traditionally upheld the right of individuals to make decisions regarding
their personality—might find that the restaurant owner has a right to have the
undesirable links removed because he is not a public figure, and therefore
has the right to make decisions about how his image is used.108 Under
French law, however, the same restaurant owner might not be afforded the
same protection since French courts have held that an individual can request
that data processing cease only in certain circumstances, like when the
information is inaccurate or expired.109
Like the Directive-based method, allowing member states to take control
of balancing the competing rights will not lead to the harmonization in law
that the EU prefers.110 The uncertainty such a standard presents is
particularly harmful for those search engine companies that operate within
multiple member states. Those companies would likely have a difficult time
adjusting to different standards with respect to data protection laws.111
Conversely, consistency in the data protection laws of each member state
would better facilitate the sharing of information across state lines. Search
engine operators would not have to look to dozens of different rules before
providing links to information published online. The CJEU has previously
concluded that allowing member states to engage in the balancing of rights
did not create issues of “predictability” or consistency,112 however, the lack
of clear standards for broader harmonization of data protection laws among
individual member states renders it nearly impossible to avoid such
uncertainty.
Although the balancing tests employed by the CJEU in previous data
protection cases have their shortcomings, they are illustrative of the kinds of
considerations the court should apply to the right to be forgotten in the
future. For example, from the Directive–based method, search engine
See Lebach I, supra note 47, at 479–80.
French Data Protection Law, supra note 59, art. 40.
110 See supra notes 103, 105 and accompanying text.
111 General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 21, at 1–2 (noting the lack of a
comprehensive approach to personal data protection in the EU “risks slowing down the
development of innovative uses of new technologies”).
112 Bodil Lindqvist, Case C-101/01, ¶ 84.
108
109
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companies and courts learn the kind of factors for balancing that exist under
EU law. Similarly, from the individual application method, courts and
companies learn that questions of balancing may require consideration of the
policies of each member state. These considerations provide a basic
foundation upon which the CJEU might build a more expansive or applicable
test for the right to be forgotten.
3. Scholarly Opinions on Balancing the Rights at Issue
Scholarly opinions provide another source for balancing the right to be
forgotten and the freedom of expression. For example, Advocate General
Niilo Jääskinen believes that “the fundamental right to information merits
particular protection in EU law.”113 He then cautions against any method
that places a duty to balance competing private and public interests in the
hands of internet search engines.114 Jääskinen argues that allowing search
engine companies to create an applicable test would likely lead to the
companies being inundated with removal requests, the automatic withdrawal
of any objected content, and the disregard of the interests of the original
publishers of the information.115 Moreover, he also argues that this method
would inevitably result in censorship by the search engine operators.116
Notably, however, the Advocate General does not mention who should
shoulder the burden of creating and applying a test for balancing the
competing interests.
Some EU scholars note that provisions in the GDPR suggest a way to
accommodate the interests of private persons and the countervailing interests
of the public.117 The GDPR—a reform proposal for the Data Protection
Directive—provides that a right to be forgotten can be limited when
exceptions are necessary for journalistic, artistic, or literary expression, for
protecting the public interest in public health, or for historical, statistical, or
scientific research purposes.118 The GDPR’s methods for choosing between
Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen, Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia
Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD) ¶ 107, 121 (May 13, 2014) [hereinafter Opinion of
Advocate General Jääskinen], http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=138
782&doclang=EN. It is important to note that the opinions of Advocate Generals are written
independently of the CJEU judgments on cases and are not binding.
114 Id. ¶ 133.
115 Id. ¶¶ 133–134.
116 Id. ¶ 134.
117 Lindsay, supra note 4, at 290–91.
118 General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 21, at 52, art. 17(3).
113
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competing rights differ from those employed by other EU instruments on
data protection by allowing for derogation from the right to be forgotten for
research purposes and public health.119 Other scholars suggest that the
ability to derogate from a right to be forgotten should extend to all forms of
expression, not just creative or journalistic expression.120 However, such a
method for balancing competing rights goes beyond anything currently
endorsed by the CJEU or the Data Protection Directive.
Given these suggestions by EU scholars, how would the hypothetical
cases be decided? In the case of the politician who wants to remove search
links to a news article, scholarly opinions suggest that his request should not
be honored. Though he has an interest in privacy under GDPR Article 52—
particularly if the information is outdated—it would likely be argued that
there is some journalistic purpose that warrants keeping the links.
Conversely, the balance between the freedom of expression and the right to
be forgotten seems to tip in the other direction in the case of the student. The
journalistic, artistic, or public health purpose of the photos seems minimal, if
not nonexistent. Thus, the student may have good cause for arguing that
limiting free expression here is necessary in order to protect her rights and
freedoms. Lastly, in the case of the restaurant owner, it might be argued that
there is some journalistic purpose in allowing links to the bad reviews to
continue being displayed in search results. There may even be some public
health purpose for the continued display of the links if they alleged
unsanitary conditions in the restaurant. In this last case, the balance shifts
once more toward the right to freedom of expression and allowing the links
to remain active.
The methods suggested by scholars and the above hypothetical analysis
support an argument that the rights at issue can coexist within EU law. As
Advocate General Jääskinen noted, the right to free expression is highly
valued in the EU.121 Individual rights to privacy are also valued. In an
attempt to find a balance between those rights, the drafters of the Charter on
Fundamental Rights of the European Union provided a framework for

Id.
Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, Draft Report on the Proposal for
a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Protection of Individuals
with regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, at
51–52, COM (2012) 0011 (Dec. 17, 2012), available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meet
docs/2009_2014/documents/libe/pr/922/922387/922387en.pdf.
121 Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen, supra note 113.
119
120
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adjudication under Article 52.122 Similarly, Article 9 of the Data Protection
Directive offers some guidance as to how to balance the rights at issue.
Thus, two separate documents have contemplated the tension between
privacy rights and freedom of information. However, neither EU scholars
nor the CJEU consider the tension to be so dispositive as to require that one
right always be upheld over the other. The insistence of EU bodies and
scholars on striking a balance between a right to be forgotten and the
freedom of expression shows that these rights can coexist.
IV. WAYS A RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION CAN
COEXIST
The CJEU’s failure to provide substantive guidelines in its Google Spain
decision left open questions of how a right to be forgotten should be
balanced against an existing freedom of expression, who should do the
balancing, and on what grounds such a claim may be raised. Using the
aforementioned hypothetical situations as a guide, this Note offers
suggestions for how those questions may be answered.
A. Easing Tension by Stating When a State May Derogate from a Right to
Be Forgotten
To ease the tension between the rights at issue, it is critical that the CJEU
delineate with greater detail when a state may derogate from the right to be
forgotten. Despite acknowledging the need to conduct a balancing inquiry
between the rights at issue, the CJEU went on to conclude that such a
balance “may however depend, in specific cases, on the nature of the
information in question and its sensitivity for the data subject’s private life
and on the interest of the public in having that information.”123
Unfortunately, the court failed to adequately explain the parameters of the
public interest exception. Instead, it merely noted that an individual’s role in
public life would be a consideration in assessing whether the exception
would apply.124 Indeed, it would be easier to determine which right will hold
more weight in a given context if the CJEU specifically stated what kinds of
information fall under the broad heading of “public interest.”
Charter, art. 52, 2012 O.J. (C326) 406, 407 (detailing the process for determining how to
properly interpret, apply, and prioritize the rights provided for by the Charter).
123 Google Spain, Case C-131/12, ¶ 81 (emphasis added).
124 Id. ¶ 97.
122
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Using the language included in the Data Protection Directive would be
one way the CJEU could expand upon its public interest exception. As
previously stated, Article 9 allows member states to derogate from the
Directive’s provisions when information is processed for artistic, literary,
and journalistic purposes.125 This Article provides a means by which states
can limit an individual’s freedom of privacy when doing so is necessary to
protect the freedom of expression.126 The CJEU could adopt a similar
position in the context of the right to be forgotten, and hold that individuals
do not have a right of removal when that information exists for certain
specified purposes.
For example, the CJEU could stipulate that when information is collected
for journalistic reasons, a removal request would be considered under a
stricter standard of review. Nevertheless, such a standard would inevitably
require courts to further expand upon the true meaning “journalistic
purpose”—a heavy burden in a time when it is difficult to draw a line
between journalism and information simply published on a blog. Although
the Data Protection Directive does not contain language defining the term,
the GDPR may provide some helpful insight into how the courts could
interpret what constitutes a journalistic purpose. The GDPR’s Explanatory
Memorandum describes journalistic purpose as those activities engaged in
for “the disclosure to the public of information, opinions or ideas,
irrespective of the medium which is used to transmit them.” 127 Even with
that description, the problem of defining journalistic purpose is a massive
undertaking CJEU must face.128
Furthermore, while the journalistic purpose standard found in the Data
Protection Directive may provide one avenue for expounding upon the public
interest exception, the CJEU would still have to determine if it is the best
test. On the one hand, this journalistic purpose test would answer some
questions left open by Google Spain. For example, a test of this nature may
show when the right to be forgotten can be invoked, and further provide an
additional standard by which both search engine companies and member
states can measure whether a removal request should be honored. In
addition, it differs from the public interest standard employed by the CJEU in
that it takes into consideration the interest of a particular group, the
Data Protection Directive, supra note 22, art. 9.
Id.
127 General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 21, at 36 ¶ 121.
128 Due to the complexity of this issue, defining what it means for an activity to have been
completed for a journalistic purpose is beyond the scope of this Note.
125
126
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journalism profession. Finally, in considering whether the information was
collected with a journalistic purpose, the court would be adhering to the free
expression rights included in Article 11 of the Charter. If the CJEU is
interested in finding a balance between the rights at issue, this journalistic
purpose test—to the extent the court can overcome the definition problem
noted above—would be a pivotal first step in that direction.
On the other hand, a journalistic purpose test could be subject to the same
criticism as the general ‘in the public interest’ standard. In some ways,
stating that the balance sways towards freedom of expression when the
information was collected for journalistic purposes is just as illusory as the
existing standard. Arguably, any piece of information could be said to have
been collected for a journalistic purpose. Despite this fact, a journalistic
purpose standard coupled with an ‘in the public interest’ standard would
provide more guidance to search engine companies and the member states
than either standard on its own.
Alternatively, the CJEU could adhere to the public interest standard it set
out and look to prior case law to better explain what kind of information is in
the public interest. Providing greater detail about what constitutes the public
interest would also help to settle how to balance the right to be forgotten and
the freedom of expression in certain circumstances. For example, in
Tietosuojavaltuutettu v. Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy, the CJEU explained
in great detail what constitutes the public interest.129 That language could
easily be applied to the right to be forgotten. In that case the court stated
“public interest arises in any case where the information communicated
relates to a public debate which is actually being conducted.”130 The court
further held that certain topics are by their nature matters of public interest.131
Those topics include information from public hearings, transparency of
political life, and “information on the ideas and attitudes, as well as the
conduct, of prominent politicians.”132 Lastly, the CJEU noted that certain
kinds of information are not matters of public interest. Specifically,
information about an individual’s private life that has no connection with the
person’s public life or does not contribute to any debate of general interest to
society is not within the public interest.133 Ultimately, the court concluded

129
130
131
132
133

Satakunnan Markkinapörssi, Case C-73/07, ¶¶ 71–74.
Id. ¶ 73.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 74.
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the test for public interest should be whether an individual has a “legitimate
expectation of respect for his or her private life.”134
The CJEU’s explanation of what does and does not constitute the public
interest—when combined with other tests—would likely provide some
standard for balancing the rights at issue. That conclusion can be drawn by
returning to the hypothetical cases of the politician, student, and restaurant
owner. In the case of the politician, the links may not have to be removed,
since they arguably include information concerning the ideas and attitudes of
a prominent politician. The restaurant owner too would not fare well under
this public interest test—the links to the reviews relate to his public life, and
arguably contribute to a debate of general public interest. The student would
likely have the best outcome under this proposed public interest standard.
Even if the photos were posted for some journalistic purpose, the student is
not a public person and arguably has a legitimate expectation of privacy in
this context. Additionally, links to the photos do not contribute to an issue
that is of general public interest.
At the very least, by adopting this standard and combining it with other
tests, the court could provide individuals with more information about what
constitutes the public interest. In addition EU citizens would be able to
predict with greater certainty whether a search engine company is obligated
to honor their request for removal. That would be an important step towards
resolving the questions left open by Google Spain.
B. Easing Tension by Providing Clear Standards for Honoring the Right to
Be Forgotten Requests
The second step towards harmonizing the right to be forgotten with the
existing right of free expression would be to provide clearer standards for
when companies must honor individuals’ removal requests. In the wake of
Google Spain, search engine companies have largely been left with the task
of making determinations on removal requests.135 Throughout Google Spain,
the court noted that information is no longer necessary when it appears “to be
inadequate, irrelevant or no longer relevant, or excessive.”136 However, the
Id.
Factsheet on the Right to be Forgotten Ruling, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.
eu/justice/data-protection/files/factsheets/factsheet_data_protection_en.pdf (“Google will have
to assess deletion requests on a case-by-case basis and apply the criteria mentioned in EU law
and the European Court’s judgment.”).
136 Google Spain, Case C-131/12, ¶ 93.
134
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EU’s Commissioner for Justice recognized that such standards are
subjective.137 Those seeking to invoke the right to be forgotten and the
search engine companies charged with honoring their requests may have
different opinions on when the adequacy, relevance, and accuracy
requirements are met. As such, more uniform standards are needed to inform
individuals of exactly when their rights can be invoked.
C. Easing Tension by Adopting Standards Currently Used by Data
Processing Companies
In seeking to adopt more uniform standards for right to be forgotten
requests, the CJEU could follow the approach Google has recently
implemented. Google has set up a separate website for individuals to supply
their name, photo identification, and explanation for the deletion request.138
Of the requests it has received, the company has removed links where the
information involves nude photographs uploaded to the internet against the
requester’s will, HIV diagnoses, and outdated political views.139 Among
those deletion requests that have been refused are those that involve
information regarding sex offender convictions, reports of violent crime
(even when the individual was later acquitted), and patient reviews of
doctors.140 From these initial removal requests, the EU can derive a standard
for when requests to remove information will be honored. Turning to the
hypothetical cases presented above, it becomes clear who could have their
removal request honored under this last proposed test. In the case of the
politician—barring the considerations about his status as a public figure and
journalistic purpose—he may be able to have the links removed because they
represent outdated views. The student too would be able to achieve her
desired result since Google has granted similar requests.141
The
restauranteur, however, would not be so lucky. His case is very similar to a
137 Alex Hern, EU Commissioner: Right to Be Forgotten is No Harder to Enforce than
Copyright, THE GUARDIAN, June 4, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/jun/
04/eu-commissioner-right-to-be-forgotten-enforce-copyright-google.
138 Barr & Winkler, supra note 9.
139
Drawing the Line: Google Grapples with the Consequences of a Controversial Ruling on
the Boundary between Privacy and Free Speech, ECONOMIST, Oct. 4, 2014, http://www.econo
mist.com/news/international/21621804-google-grapples-consequences-controversial-ruling-bo
undary-between.
140 Id.
141 Id. (noting that Google has granted requests where the information involved nude
photographs uploaded to the internet against his or her will).
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context where a right to be forgotten request has not been honored—patient
reviews of doctors.
As a general rule, the CJEU could hold that people have a right to invoke
the right to be forgotten when the information concerns solely private matters
that have nothing to do with that individual’s public life. Conversely,
individuals would not have a right to delete links that involve matters that
relate to his or her public life, or are of public concern. Of course, such a
crude distinction may raise the question of what constitutes the public
interest, and overlap with the analysis the CJEU would have to consider in
that regard. Even so, this distinction would go a long way towards providing
the public with a basic standard for understanding when their request would
be honored. More than this, it would provide a clearer understanding of what
exactly the right to be forgotten entails.
Any standard for clarifying the right to be forgotten and balancing that
right with the existing freedom of expression will require much more
analysis than provided here. This right is new, and both the CJEU and
search engine companies are on a long road towards identifying what aspects
of the right work and which aspects require reform. Until the CJEU moves
to answer the questions left open by Google Spain, there will be some
ambiguity in the law. This Note provides some answers to those questions
by stating that the right to be forgotten can coexist with freedom of
expression norms, and by offering suggestions for how the CJEU might ease
the tension between those rights. Important questions of how the right to be
forgotten should develop from here remain. The ability of search engine
companies, courts, and the general public to function effectively depends on
the answers to those questions.

